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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequent fliers in the criminal justice context are a “very active
group of minor offenders who cycle through local correctional
institutions on a regular basis.”1 Police and prosecutors use the term
generically, often referring to a defendant with many prior arrests as a
“frequent flier.”2
Frequent fliers are, presumably, familiar with
interrogation procedures employed by the police and are less likely to be
coerced by the hostile and intimidating environments of a custodial
interrogation. In particular, because they are familiar with police
1 Marilyn Chandler Ford, Frequent Fliers: The High Demand User in Local
Corrections, 3 CALIFORNIAN J. HEALTH PROMOTION 61, 61 (2005) (“These persons, whom
practitioners have labeled frequent fliers, are characterized by their high-volume of jail
admissions and discharges. In most cases, these offenders have dozens of arrests and jail
admissions—but some high-demand users have been admitted more than a hundred
times.”).
See also Frequent Flier Definition, DOUBLETONGUED.ORG, http://
www.doubletongued.org/index.php/dictionary/frequent_flier (defining frequent flier as “a
repeat offender; a recidivist; (generally) a person who regularly or habitually uses or
takes advantage of a service”). The Pierce County, Washington, Criminal Justice Task
Force formed a work group to deal with the issue of “frequent fliers,” defined as “chronic
minor offenders who are heavy users of county and private sector resources.” Criminal
Justice Task Force Work Groups, PIERCE COUNTY WASH. (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://www.co.pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/CJTF_Work_Groups-Nov4revised.pdf.
2 For example, a captain of the Massillon Police Department referred to a suspect
(named Donald Duck) with “multiple previous DUIs, multiple previous no operator’s
license and operating under suspension,” as a frequent flier. Ben Muessig, Cops Accuse
Donald Duck of Driving Drunk, AOL NEWS (June 29, 2010, 11:56 AM),
http://www.aolnews.com/weird-news/article/cops-accuse-donald-duck-of-driving-drunk/
19535273 (internal citations omitted). See also KIDCOP, Cop Talk Forum, OFFICER.COM
(Oct. 5, 2001, 12:05 AM, http://forums.officer.com/forums/archive/index.php/t16243.html (defining “frequent flier” as “someone who goes to jail allot/often [sic]”);
and From Halfway House Back To The Big House: “Frequent Flier” (Repeat Offender)
Returns
to
Prison,
LEXINGTONPROSECUTOR.COM
(Mar.
5,
2010),
http://www.lexingtonprosecutor.com/?p=2922#more-2922 (prosecutor news release
states that “frequent flier” with six convictions was returned to prison).
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procedure and tactics, the psychological effects of police interrogation
tactics—which are the result of isolating suspects and cutting them off
from the outside world—have a less significant effect on frequent fliers.3
The original purpose underlying the Court’s decision in Miranda v.
Arizona,4 thus, was to reduce the likelihood that suspects would fall
victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation
in an intimidating atmosphere.5 Miranda was intended to limit what was
thought to be the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogations.6 In Miranda, the Court established a set of “procedural
safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing
custodial interrogation.”7
Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the
Supreme Court decided four cases interpreting Miranda that featured
frequent fliers: Montejo v. Louisiana,8 Florida v. Powell,9 Maryland v.
Shatzer,10 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.11 In all four cases, the suspects
were presumably familiar with the Miranda warnings, were aware that
the police would honor the Miranda warnings, were familiar with police
tactics, and, as a result, were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation
3 Contra Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential
Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.179 (2010) (stating that confessions may be unreliable
because “suspects may be surrounded by the police, isolated in an interrogation room, cut
off from the outside world, and not fully aware of their rights or the legal system. When
a suspect is scared, the suspect may be more likely to make incriminating statements by
mistake.”).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 444–45.
See also Mark Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The
International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal
for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1758 (2002) (“The Miranda
warnings were designed to counteract the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogation. By advising a suspect of his rights, the police alleviate some of the
compulsion associated with custodial questioning and provide an atmosphere in which a
suspect could knowingly and freely invoke those rights if he so desires.”); Harvey Gee,
An Ambiguous Request for Counsel Before, and Not After a Miranda Waiver: United
States v. Rodriguez, United States v. Fry and State v. Blackburn, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 51, 52
(2009) (“[T]he Miranda Court was concerned with the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogations.”); Conor G. Bateman, Note, Dickerson v. United States:
Miranda Is Deemed a Constitutional Rule, but Does It Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV.
177, 201 (2002) (“The ‘protective devices’ that the Miranda Court thought necessary to
dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation are now collectively
known as the ‘Miranda warnings.’”).
7 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201 (1989).
8 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
9 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
10 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
11 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
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of custodial interrogation. In deciding these four cases, the Court could
infer that the suspects were less likely to make a coerced confession as a
result of the psychological effects of police interrogation techniques. In
other words, while the original Miranda decision held that the
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation generates “inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” these
later decisions shift the focus from the atmosphere to whether the
individual suspects were actually compelled to make incriminating
statements.12 As a result, the Court was able to continue a process of
limiting the scope of the original Miranda decision by focusing more
responsibility on the subjective knowledge of suspects rather than the
actions of law enforcement.
Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins all begin with the
generally uncontested premise that the rights described in Miranda may
be waived.13 While the validity of a waiver is assessed based on the
totality of the circumstances, the Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set
of factors for courts to consider in determining whether a suspect’s
waiver was voluntary. In particular, the Court has not explicitly
considered a suspect’s criminal history and familiarity with the criminal
justice system in determining whether a waiver was voluntary. However,
lower federal and state courts interpreting the voluntariness of a
confession have explicitly included a suspect’s criminal background
among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness.14
This Article examines the Supreme Court and lower courts’
increased consideration of the criminal background of suspects, whether
implicit or explicit, in determining whether a Miranda waiver is made in
a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner. Part I of this Article
reviews existing Miranda doctrine and the factors considered by the
Supreme Court in determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Part II reviews the four Miranda
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court. Part III examines the
common theme of experienced defendants in the four cases, and
proceeds to review the manner in which lower courts have taken the
criminal background of suspects into account in determining whether a
12

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
See, e.g., Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (“Our precedents also place beyond doubt
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as
relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”) (citing Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, n.4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See also Burghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2264;
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219; Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203.
14 See infra Part IV.
13
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Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Finally, Part IV
examines the implications for the future of the Miranda doctrine as the
Supreme Court considers the subjective knowledge of suspects in
determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.
II. CURRENT VIEWS ON MIRANDA
Miranda, as currently understood, protects the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights of the accused.15 The Fifth Amendment provides
protection against compelled self-incrimination, providing that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”16 Meanwhile, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an
accused the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal
proceeding.17 The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal

15 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
Although Miranda has its roots in the Fifth
Amendment, the case is now understood as establishing rules to protect rights under both
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Miranda Court described the original issue before
the Court as “the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure
that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
In Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293, the Court explained that the required warnings adequately
inform defendants not only of their Fifth Amendment rights, but of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as well. See also United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 484
(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that Miranda has “roots in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”);
United States v. Tyler, 993 F.2d 1548 (Table) (6th Cir. 1993) (“A waiver of the right to
counsel after receiving proper Miranda warnings constitutes a limited relinquishment of
the right to counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment.”); United States v.
Carneglia, 603 F.Supp.2d 488, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a “proper Miranda
warning serves to advise an arrestee of both his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel”).
16 U.S. CONST. amend V.
17 U.S. CONST. amend VI. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25
(1984) (noting that courts must reverse criminal defendants’ convictions “without any
showing of prejudice [to defendant] when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented
from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding”). In particular, the
Supreme Court has stated that a critical stage is “a step of a criminal proceeding . . . that
h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696
(2002). A critical stage is one at which “[a]vailable defenses may be [ ] irretrievably
lost,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961), and “where rights are preserved or
lost,” White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963). However, interrogation is one of the
critical stages. See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629–
30 (1986). The Supreme Court has not provided a definitive list of Cronic “critical
stages.” United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). But the Court’s
cases provide several examples of critical stages. See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
81 (2004) (entry of a guilty plea); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)
(sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (post-indictment
lineup). The Court has also provided examples of stages that are not critical. See United
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defenses.”18
The Court established in Miranda a set of “procedural safeguards
that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial
interrogation.”19 While the possibility of physical coercion remained a
fear, the focus of the Court in Miranda was on the psychological effects
of custodial interrogation.20 The Court stated, for example, that it was
concerned that “[e]ven without employing brutality, the ‘third degree’ or
the specific stratagems [of police], the very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals.”21 The original purpose underlying Miranda, thus, was to
“reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to
constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation . . . .”22
Miranda accomplished this purpose through a preemptive effort to
alleviate the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations
by informing or reminding the subject of the interrogation of the rights to
silence and counsel.23 In this way, the focus of Miranda was on police

States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (post-indictment photographic lineup); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (handwriting exemplar).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 398 (“The right to counsel . . .
means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” (internal quotes omitted)).
19 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195, 201 (1989)). The Supreme Court originally defined custodial interrogation as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444. But see infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Court distinguished between its earlier characterization of “custodial interrogation,” and
the scenario presented in Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (1210)).
20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (“[W]e stress that the modern practice of in-custody
interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented”).
21 Id. at 456.
22 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). See also Rice v. Cooper, 148
F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998) (“The relevant constitutional principles are aimed not at
protecting people from themselves but at curbing abusive practices by public officers.”).
23 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”).
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conduct, not on whether a particular suspect was subject to psychological
coercion in a particular case.24
The warnings required by Miranda are part of the popular culture,
and well known to all Americans with a television set.25 Accordingly,
prior to any custodial interrogation, a defendant must be informed:
[1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.26

Although the content of the four warnings is necessary, no “magic
words” or specific language has been required by the Court.27 Rather,
the only requirement is that the Miranda warnings “clearly inform[ ]” the
individual of his rights.28 In determining whether law enforcement
officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, courts are not required
to examine the words employed “as if construing a will or defining the
terms of an easement.”29 Further, “[t]he inquiry is simply whether the
warnings reasonably “convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by
Miranda.’”30 All that is required is that the warning reasonably conveys
the contents of the four rights specified in Miranda.31

24 Id. at 468 (“[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given”).
25 United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“As every
television viewer knows, an officer ordinarily may not interrogate a suspect who is in
custody without informing her of her Miranda rights.”); United States v. DeNoyer, 811
F.2d 436, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that term “Miranda Warnings” “is commonly
used, both in court and in television shows, to describe the ritual prescribed in Miranda v.
Arizona”); United States v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR-45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344, at *2 (D.
Utah, Apr. 8, 2010) (defendant testified “that he was very aware of his Miranda rights
because of television . . .”). See also Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media:
Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761, 761
(2007) (“Not only did television make the Miranda warnings famous, its adoption of
Miranda as an icon of criminal procedure may be main the reason Miranda is good law
today.”).
26 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203 (2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
27 See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (“The inquiry is simply
whether the warnings reasonably ‘convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by
Miranda.’”); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam) (“[N]o
talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda’s] strictures”); Thai v. Mapes, 412
F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has recognized that there are no magic words
that automatically satisfy Miranda’s constitutional concerns.”).
28 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
29 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., id.
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There are clear consequences to law enforcement for the failure to
follow the procedure set forth in Miranda. “[T]he prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.”32 This aspect of the Miranda decision is often the subject
of the most impassioned debate. Critics of the decision have, for a long
time, claimed that valid confessions are excluded because of the failure
of police to follow proper procedures and, as a result, the guilty go free.
In 1986, for example, a Wisconsin judge wrote that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence seemed to be “more intent on finding reasons to let
admittedly guilty criminals escape punishment than in doing justice for
society.”33 And, in 2000, Professor Cassel argued on PBS’s NewsHour
that “70,000 violent criminal cases each year go unsolved because of
Miranda.”34
A. Assertion of Rights: Edwards, Minnick and Davis
In Edwards v. Arizona35 and Minnick v. Mississippi, 36 the Supreme
Court addressed the actions law enforcement must take after suspects
assert their Miranda rights. The defendant in Edwards had been arrested
at his home on a warrant for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.37
At the police station, the detectives provided the defendant with his
Miranda warnings.38
The defendant acknowledged that that he
understood his rights, provided a taped statement presenting an alibi
defense, and indicated that he wanted to negotiate “a deal.”39 The
defendant then indicated that he “want[ed] an attorney before making a
deal.”40 At this point, the police stopped any questioning.41 However,
the next morning, two detectives came to the jail to interview the
defendant.42 The detectives provided the defendant with his Miranda

32

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
RALPH ADAM FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY xii (1986).
34 PBS Newshour: Revisiting Miranda (PBS television broadcast Jan. 6, 2000),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june00/miranda_1-6.html).
See
also
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 16–17 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
35 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481–84 (1981).
36 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
37 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 479.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 479
33
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warnings.43 The detectives were able to obtain a confession from the
defendant by playing a portion of his accomplice’s statement.44 Based,
in part, on this statement, the defendant was convicted.45
The Supreme Court held that the use of the defendant’s second
statement violated his Constitutional rights.46
In reaching this
conclusion, the Court reasoned that the right to counsel required “special
protection,” and that in order to provide that special protection additional
safeguards would be necessary.47 The Court then set forth what has
become known as the “Edwards rule”—when an accused requests an
attorney, he may not be questioned unless an attorney has been made
available or the accused initiates the conversation.48
The Supreme Court revisited the Edwards rule in Minnick v.
Mississippi.49 In Minnick, the defendant was accused of, among other
crimes, murdering two people in Mississippi after escaping from a local
jail.50 The defendant was arrested in California four months later.51 The
defendant claimed that while in jail in California, the police mistreated
him.52 The FBI subsequently interviewed the defendant.53 The FBI
special agents provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings.54 The
defendant provided a brief statement and told the special agents to “come
back . . . when I have a lawyer,” and that he would make a more
complete statement with his lawyer present.55
The FBI special agents ended the interview and a court-appointed
attorney met with the defendant.56 A few days later, a sheriff’s deputy
from Mississippi arrived in California and interviewed the defendant.57
The deputy provided defendant with his Miranda warnings; he
43

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981).
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 487.
47 Id. at 483–84.
48 Id. at 484–85. Cf. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (suspect
who had invoked his right to counsel initiated conversation while being transported by
asking the officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”).
49 498 U.S. 146, 146 (1990).
50 Id. at 148. The defendant, along with a co-defendant, escaped from a local jail and
broke into a mobile home. Id. During the course of the burglary, the men were
interrupted by the owner and another man, accompanied by an infant. Id. The two adults
were murdered. Id. Two women who subsequently arrived at the mobile home “were
held at gunpoint, then bound hand and foot.” Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148–49 (1990).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 149.
44
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proceeded to provide a statement to the deputy sheriff. 58 Based on the
inculpatory statements to the deputy, as well as other evidence, the
defendant was convicted on two counts of murder and sentenced to
death.59
The Minnick Court explained that Edwards was “designed to
prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously
asserted Miranda rights” and that the Edwards rule was intended to
ensure that “any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the
result of coercive pressures.”60 For this reason, the Court believed that
the presence of counsel prevents coercion and that the Edwards rule’s
purpose is served by an interpretation that after a suspect has requested
counsel, just the opportunity to consult with counsel is insufficient;
instead, “the authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in
counsel’s absence.”61 This interpretation was justified by the view that
meeting with an attorney would not eliminate the inherently coercive
pressures of custody or the possibility of abusive tactics by the police.62
The Court was also concerned that suspects may not fully understand
their rights by just meeting with, or consulting, an attorney.63 The Court
concluded: “when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and
officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present,
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.”64 The Court
emphasized that this rule was not intended to undermine the principle of
“individual responsibility” inherent in the decision by suspects to
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive their Miranda rights, even
after counsel has been requested.65 The Court maintained that suspects

58

Id. at 148.
Id.
60 Id. at 150 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). The Court
also asserted a practical justification for the Edwards rule: “Edwards conserves judicial
resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of
voluntariness, and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and
straightforward terms.” Id. at 151.
61 Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152 (1990).
62 Id. at 155.
63 Id. The Court explained:
Consultation is not a precise concept, for it may encompass variations
from a telephone call to say that the attorney is en route, to a hurried
interchange between the attorney and client in a detention facility
corridor, to a lengthy in-person conference in which the attorney gives
full and adequate advice respecting all matters that might be covered in
further interrogations.
Id.
64 Id. at 153.
65 Id. at 156.
59
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retain the ability to waive their Miranda rights after counsel has been
requested, so long as the suspects initiate the conversations.66
The Court considered the necessary language the defendant must
use to make the protections of Edwards and Minnick applicable in Davis
v. United States.67 In Davis, the defendant was a suspect in a murder
investigation conducted by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).68 The
defendant was interviewed at the NIS office and, after receiving the
appropriate warnings required by military law, waived his rights to
remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing.69 After about
ninety minutes of questioning, the defendant said, “[m]aybe I should talk
to a lawyer.”70 The NIS interviewers reminded the defendant of his
rights, and he continued the interview for another hour before stating, “I
think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.”71
In reviewing whether the defendant’s initial statement constituted
an invocation of Miranda rights for Edwards and Minnick purposes, the
Court instructed lower courts to conduct an “objective inquiry” into
whether the “statement . . . can reasonably be construed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.”72 The Court
limited this inquiry, however, by holding that a “reference to an attorney
that is ambiguous or equivocal” is not sufficient to trigger Miranda rights
and require the cessation of a custodial interview.73 Rather, the suspect
must unambiguously request counsel.74 In reaching this conclusion, the
Davis Court explained:
The rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect
a suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present
during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting
the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the
suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation
of questioning “would transform the Miranda safeguards into
66

Id.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
68 Id. at 454.
69 Id. at 454–55.
70 Id. at 455.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 458–59.
73 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). But see United States v. Plugh,
576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Davis does not instruct courts how to analyze an
initial invocation of one’s Fifth Amendment rights following the Miranda warnings
where no waiver occurred. In our view, Davis only provides guidance for circumstances
in which a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived
Fifth Amendment rights.”).
74 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97–98 (1984) (per
curiam)).
67

314

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:303

wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative
activity,” because it would needlessly prevent the police from
questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the
suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.75

The Court acknowledged that this rule could “disadvantage some
suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a
variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel
although they actually want to have a lawyer present.”76 However, the
Court believed that the potential loss of legitimate confessions that might
not otherwise be obtained from a tighter rule outweighed this concern.77
B. Waiver Inquiry
The subject of a custodial interrogation may waive the rights
described in Miranda. In Miranda the Court held that a “defendant may
waive effectuation” of the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”78 There is a
presumption against waiver, of which the Government may overcome by
a preponderance of the evidence.79
The validity of a waiver must be assessed by a reviewing court on
the totality of the circumstances.80 The prosecution must present
evidence that the defendant was aware of “the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”81 The
waiver inquiry has two dimensions: First, the relinquishment of the right
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free

75

Id. at 460 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
Id. at 461.
77 See id.
78 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). Some analysts have suggested that because of the differences between the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the Court has employed a different waiver standard.
See, e.g., Geoffrey Sweeney, Note, If You Want It You Had Better Ask For It: How
Montejo v. Louisiana Permits Law Enforcement to Sidestep the Sixth Amendment, 55
LOY. L. REV. 619, 621 (2009). However, the Supreme Court recently held that the waiver
analysis is the same whether the suspect is waiving Miranda rights under the Fifth or
Sixth Amendments. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (“[T]here is
no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has
invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.”). See also
infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text (discussing Thompkins).
79 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); North Carolina v. Butler, 441
U.S. 369, 373 (1966).
80 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77. Cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725
(1979) (finding that the requirements of Miranda apply the same to juveniles as adults).
81 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
76
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and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.82
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.83
The Supreme Court has yet to elaborate a set of factors for courts to
consider in determining whether a suspect’s waiver was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary. The limit of the guidance provided by the
Court is that “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interview
and waiver must reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level
of comprehension.”84 The Court has said that the question of whether
Miranda rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived must be
determined “on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the]
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.”85
The closest the Court has come to setting forth a comprehensive list
of factors to be considered in evaluating a Miranda waiver was in Fare v.
Michael C.86 In Fare, the Court considered a confession by a juvenile.87
In assessing whether a Miranda waiver by the juvenile was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary, the Court explained:
[The] totality of the circumstances approach is adequate to
determine whether there has been a waiver even where
interrogation of juveniles is involved . . . . The totality approach
permits—indeed it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.88

The Fare Court did not, however, suggest that the list provided was
exhaustive.89
82 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
404 (1977).
83 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
84 Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir.2000) (citing Moran, 475 U.S.
at 421).
85 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1966) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
86 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
87 Id. at 710–11.
88 Id. at 725.
89 In contrast, compare the detailed direction provided by the Supreme Court in
reviewing whether consents to searches are voluntary in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973). In that case, the Supreme Court relied upon cases assessing the
voluntary nature of confessions, and held that the voluntary nature of providing consent
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Many of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have established a more
comprehensive set of factors for consideration when assessing whether a
waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, has suggested that trial courts consider, among other factors,
the defendant’s background, his mental and physical condition, and the
duration and conditions of detention.90 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has
explained that examination of the totality of circumstances includes, but
is not limited to, such considerations as the “background, experience, and
conduct” of the defendant.91 The Tenth Circuit has identified five factors
that should be considered to determine whether a Miranda waiver was
voluntary:
(1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the
length of [any] detention; (3) the length and nature of the
questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of [his or]
her constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was
subjected to physical punishment. 92

The Third Circuit has provided several factors to guide this analysis: the
defendant’s age, education, intelligence, occupation, advice of rights
administered, length of detention, length of questioning, physical or
mental punishment or exhaustion.93 Accordingly, an advisement of
Miranda rights and a subsequent valid waiver of those rights are
significant factors, among other factors, to be considered in determining
whether a confession is voluntary. Significantly, no single factor is
dispositive. The purpose of looking at all of the factors involved is to
determine whether the will of the suspect was overborne through
improper coercion.94
to a search must be assessed in “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. at 226 (internal
citations omitted). The Court continued: “Some of the factors taken into account have
included the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low intelligence; the lack
of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment
such as the deprivation of food or sleep” Id.
90 United States v. Steele, 82 Fed. App’x 172, 175 (7th Cir. 2003).
91 United States v. Jones, 23 F.3d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 418 (8th Cir. 1993)).
92 United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1579 (10th Cir. 1997). These factors are not exclusive.
The Tenth Circuit has also instructed trial courts to consider whether “the government
obtained the statements by physical or psychological coercion such that the defendant’s
will was overborne.” United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir. 1999).
93 Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1460 (3d Cir. 1984).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Artis, No. 5:10-cr-15-01, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97279
at *27 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2010) (determining whether statements by suspect with a criminal
history were the result of coercion).
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III. THE COURT’S RECENT MIRANDA CASES: MONTEJO, POWELL,
SHATZER, AND THOMPKINS
Between May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, the
Supreme Court decided four cases, described below, dealing with
Miranda-related issues. In deciding these four cases, the Court began a
process of limiting Miranda by focusing less on the objective actions of
the police and more on the subjective knowledge of suspects.
A. Montejo
The Supreme Court decided Montejo v. Louisiana in May 2009.95
In Montejo the defendant was a twenty-three-year-old at who had not
graduated from high school, had an “extensive” juvenile record, and had
been incarcerated for six years in Florida.96 The wife of the victim found
him dead in their home.97 The victim had suffered two gunshot
wounds.98 The defendant became a suspect because several neighbors
noticed his blue van, which had a “distinctive chrome cattle bar,” near
the victim’s home at the time of the murder.99 The police later
determined that a disgruntled former employee of the victim had been an
accomplice to the defendant.100 The former employee was familiar with
the victim’s routine and would have been aware that he was likely to
possess a large amount of cash on the day of the murder.101
The defendant was taken into custody and repeatedly provided with
his Miranda warnings, signed written waivers, and consented to speak to
the police detectives.102 Over the course of four hours of interviews, the
defendant admitted that he had shot the victim during an attempted
burglary.103 The defendant initially claimed that his only involvement
was in driving a co-defendant to the victim’s home and leaving him there
without knowing that the co-defendant was going to rob and kill the
victim.104
Montejo then proceeded to tell other versions of his story before
asking to speak with an attorney, at which point the detectives ended the
95

Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1264 (La. 2008).
97 Id. at 1241.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1242. The police later discovered the defendant’s DNA beneath the victim’s
fingernails. Id.
100 Id. at 1241.
101 Id.
102 The defendant conceded that he received appropriate Miranda warnings. Brief for
Petitioner at 2–3, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529).
103 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. 2008).
104 Id. at 1245.
96
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interview.105 The interview resumed, however, at the request of the
defendant.106 The defendant told several variations of the story, finally
admitting that he had believed that the house was unlocked, contained a
lot of money, and would be unoccupied.107 The defendant claimed that
he found a gun inside the house and picked it up to scare anyone away
who might come home.108 When the victim returned home, the
defendant hit him over the head with the gun, fired a warning shot, and
then, after a struggle, shot him in the head.109 The defendant then fled in
the victim’s vehicle, threw the gun into a lake, gave some money to his
co-defendants, and used the rest of the money to pay bills.110 The
validity of Montejo’s first statement was not an issue before the Supreme
Court.111
Four days after Montejo was first detained and interrogated, the
officers brought him before a judge for a mandatory initial hearing.112
The hearing was not transcribed, but the minute entry indicates that the
defendant was denied bail and had counsel appointed through the Office
of the Indigent Defender.113 After the hearing, the detectives again
approached Montejo.114 They requested that he accompany them to the
area where he had allegedly thrown the gun into the lake.115 According
to the detectives, Montejo denied that he had obtained counsel.116
Montejo subsequently testified at the trial that he told the detectives,
“Yeah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me.”117
Montejo was again provided with his Miranda rights and again
agreed to waive the same. He accompanied the detectives to the lake,
but the gun was never found.118 He also wrote a letter to the victim’s
widow, in which he sought to minimize his role in the murder and
expressed some remorse.119
105

Id. at 1244–47.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1247.
109 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1247 (La. 2008).
110 Id. at 1248.
111 Brief for Respondent at 15 n.3, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No.
07-1529).
112 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Brief for Respondent at 15, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529).
117 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1262 (La. 2008).
118 See id. at 1250 n.44.
119 The two-page letter is reprinted in the Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion, and
reads as follows (with spelling and punctuation unaltered, but capitalization normalized
for legibility):
106
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The issue before the Court was whether to overrule Michigan v.
Jackson.120 Jackson concerned the ability of law enforcement officers to
initiate an interrogation once a defendant had obtained counsel at an
arraignment or similar proceeding.121 The Court acknowledged that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel at all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and that the interrogation was
one of those critical stages.122

Ms. Ferrari,
This is very hard to put in the right words but I will try hard. My soul is
feeling you very much. If I could rwind time I wish that bullet would of
hit me. Please finish reading. I really want you to know I had no intention
on his death and I am in a log of true pain I’m so sorry I can picture your
heart dropping at sight it is eating me up inside so bad. I try to talk to
Loue every day to say I’m sorry and wish I could let you feel my
emotion to know truely how sorry and how bad this is tearing me up. I
promise you I didn’t cold blood kill Mr. Loue if I could change places I
would be dead. Please be strong only God really knows why this happen
you a beautiful woman and I’m huting more than you would really
expect to know I caused that I did crimes before but I’m really not as
harmful as what happen please forgive me Ms. Ferrari I prey for you to
be strong and get through I will prey every day I’m accepting God for
once in my life and begging for forgiveness I’m so sorry please forgive
me I was going for a simple burgulary in and out that someone put me on
and instead I found the gun so I thought if some reason some one does
come in I can scare with the gun and run but he wasn’t scared I swear I
tried to just run Ms. Fearri but he wouldn’t let me I even fired a warning
which skint him on the side but he still kept coming strong I couldn’t see
then the shot and he flew back I ran with no ride I grabed his keys I
almost shot myself the gun was cocked back agin and I didn’t know how
thats how scared I was so I shot into the couch I know you needed to
know this Ms. Ferri and may God make you strong please I need your
forgiveness Ms. Ferri I’m more than sorry for what happen please forgive
me please I’m sorry I lost my life too, my baby my beautiful girl I’m so
sorry. [signature] Please forgive me Miss. Ferri may God be with you
and make you strong because hes killing me inside.
Id. at 1250 n.49 (reprinted verbatim).
120 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
121 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. The Montejo majority and the dissent disagree about
the actual holding of Jackson. The majority claims that Jackson held that law
enforcement officers could not initiate an interrogation of a defendant “once he has
requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding.” Id. The dissent claims that
Jackson stood for the proposition that law enforcement officers could not initiate an
interrogation once an attorney-client relationship had been established. Id. at 2095
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 2085 (majority opinion). The Court has not provided a definitive list of
“critical stages.” But some cases have held certain stages to be critical. See, e.g., Iowa v.
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (entry of a guilty plea); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
358 (1977) (sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (postindictment lineup). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text (providing additional
examples of “critical stages).
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The Montejo Court did not re-examine whether the right to have
counsel present at an interrogation may be waived, so long as the waiver
is “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”123 The Court explained that
“when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to
have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those
rights, that typically does the trick . . . .”124 The Court refused to apply a
prophylactic rule prohibiting any contact with represented defendants,
similar to the rule established in Edwards v. Arizona.125 In Edwards, the
Court had held that once a suspect requests the presence of counsel, no
further interrogation may be initiated by the officers.126 This decision
was based on the premise that such a rule was necessary “to prevent
police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted
Miranda rights.”127 In Montejo, the Court placed a greater obligation on
the defendant or suspect to speak up. The Court said:
[A] defendant who does not want to speak to the police without
counsel present need only say as much when he is first
approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not
only must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later
requests is prohibited. If that regime suffices to protect the
integrity of “a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his
lawyer’s presence” before his arraignment, it is hard to see why it
would not also suffice to protect that same choice after
arraignment . . . .128

Accordingly, the Court in Montejo was willing to abandon the Jackson
rule because the existing safeguards of the Miranda regime are sufficient
to guarantee that any waiver is truly voluntary.129

123 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 n.4
(1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
124 Id.
125 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
126 Id. at 484–85.
127 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350
(1990)).
128 Id. at 2090 (citations omitted).
129 A number of commentators have criticized the approach taken by the Montejo
Court. The staff of the University of Kansas Law Review stated:
Montejo is an abrupt departure from twenty-four years of precedent
under Jackson. Indeed, the appellant Montejo did not even make the
appropriate arguments to succeed in a Jackson-less legal landscape. The
five-to-four split amongst the Court indicates that this was a contentious
decision. Jackson’s longevity suggests that Justice Scalia may have
exaggerated the rule’s practical problems. Although Jackson’s policy
interests may be served by the other prophylactic rules, the Court should
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B. Powell
In Florida v. Powell, the Court considered the Tampa Police
Department’s use of a Miranda form that did not explicitly advise the
suspect that he could have a lawyer present during questioning.130 The
defendant in Powell was facing possible charges of being a convicted
felon in possession of a gun.131 He had ten prior felony convictions.132
After arresting the defendant at his girlfriend’s apartment in
connection with a robbery investigation, the police took him into
custody.133 The police conducted a search of the apartment and
discovered a gun underneath the bed in the room that the defendant
appeared to have been occupying, at the time of their arrival.134 Prior to
his interview, the police showed the defendant the standard waiver
form.135 He indicated that he understood his rights and signed the waiver
form.136 At trial, as the State pointed out in its brief, the defendant
acknowledged that he had “waived the right to have an attorney present
during . . . questioning.”137 He then confessed to his prior felonies,
possessing the weapon for protection, and knowing that he was
prohibited by law from possessing the weapon.138
The defendant argued that the warnings used by the Tampa Police
were insufficient because they did not inform him that he could have an
attorney present during questioning.139 The warning form did not state
that the suspect had the right to have counsel present during
questioning.140 Instead, the form stated that the suspect could “talk to”
an attorney “before answering any of our questions.”141 This argument
was based on a reading of the warnings that suggested that while suspect
have attempted to fine-tune Jackson instead of simply dumping it and
risking exposure to even a small category of defendants.
58 KAN. L. REV. 1311, 1352–53 (2010).
130 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010).
131 Id.; See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1).
132 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175).
133 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
134 Florida v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 2008).
135 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200. The form states: “You have the right to remain silent.
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in
court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If
you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before
any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want
during this interview.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
136 Id.
137 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175).
138 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1201.
141 Id. at 1204.
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could consult with an attorney, he did not have a right to have an
attorney present during questioning.142
The Court rejected this argument and held that the warnings
provided to the defendant were sufficient to convey to the defendant that
he could have an attorney present.143 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court explicitly relied upon the common sense of the defendant.144 The
Court said:
A reasonable suspect in a custodial setting who has just been read
his rights, we believe, would not come to the counterintuitive
conclusion that he is obligated, or allowed, to hop in and out of
the holding area to seek his attorney’s advice. Instead, the
suspect would likely assume that he must stay put in the
interrogation room and that his lawyer would be there with him
the entire time.145

The Court also rejected the idea that the police would intentionally use
an inadequate form in the hopes of tricking suspects into waiving their
Miranda rights.146 Instead, the Court accepted the position of the
government, especially the Solicitor General as amicus curiae, that law
enforcement would prefer to eliminate the risks of suppression and the
costs of litigation by providing adequate warnings.147
C. Shatzer
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court considered the
implications of a break in custody on the Edwards rule. The defendant
was a suspect in the alleged sexual abuse of his three-year-old son.148 A
police detective assigned to the Child Advocacy Center had received a
142 The Florida Supreme Court adopted this reasoning. Id. at 1205. (“The ‘before
questioning’ warning suggests to a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes that he or she
can only consult with an attorney before questioning; there is nothing in that statement
that suggests the attorney can be present during the actual questioning.”).
143 Id. at 1204–05.
144 The Court cited to two cases where warnings, read in context, adequately
conveyed to the suspect his right to have counsel present during interrogations. Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204–05 (2010) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195
(1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam)).
145 Id. at 1205.
146 Id. at 1205–06.
At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor raised the question of
whether the police may have intentionally used improper warnings. She asked counsel
for the government: “Why wouldn’t the intent of the entity at issue be placed in question?
Meaning, you could have—the police here could have chosen to be explicit, but instead
they chose be—to obfuscate a little bit and be less explicit. Shouldn’t we assume that that
is an intent to deceive or perhaps to confuse?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16,
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175).
147 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205–06.
148 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
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report from a social worker that the suspect had received oral sex from
the child.149 The detective went to a state prison to interview the suspect,
who at the time was serving a sentence for an unrelated sexual offense.
The detective provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings and
obtained a written waiver. The defendant, after some initial confusion
about the allegations being discussed—indicated that he would not talk
without an attorney present.150 The detective then terminated the
interview.151
Approximately two and one-half years later, the police re-opened
the investigation.152 The defendant remained incarcerated on the
unrelated offense.153 The detective, who had not worked on the original
investigation, provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings and
obtained a written waiver.154 The defendant denied any physical contact
and agreed to take a polygraph examination.155 Prior to the polygraph
examination five days later, the defendant admitted to masturbating in
front of the child and then said, “I didn’t force him. I didn’t force
him.”156
The defendant was charged with the sexual abuse of his son. 157 He
filed a motion to suppress his statements, as having been made in
violation of Edwards. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant
was subsequently convicted of sexual child abuse and sentenced to
149 The child said that the defendant “pulled his pants down, exposed his penis,
apparently put milk on his penis, and told [the child] to lick his worm . . . .” Brief for
Petitioner at 3, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680). See also Brief for
Respondent at 1, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680).
150 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217. The detective wrote in his report: “When I attempted
to again initiate the interview, he [the defendant] told me that he would not talk without
an attorney present.” Brief for Respondent at 1, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08680).
151 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217.
152 According the brief from the State of Maryland, the investigation was reopened
because the police had received “additional, more specific allegations ‘because the child
was more mature, able to articulate what had happened to him several years before.’”
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680) (citing Testimony
from Suppression Hearing contained in Joint Appendix).
153 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18.
154 Id. at 1218.
155 Brief for the Petitioner at 5.
156 Id. There is some confusion about the exact timing of the inculpatory statements
about masturbating in front of the child. The Supreme Court reports that the statements
were made during the initial interview with the new detective. Id. This same report of
the facts is contained in the opinion from the Maryland Court of Appeals, and appears to
be consistent with an agreed statement of facts. Shatzer v. State, 954 A.2d 1118, 1121–
22 n.3 (Md. 2008). However, the brief from the state indicates that this admission
occurred during the pre-polygraph interview. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct.
1213 (2010) (No. 08-680). The defendant’s brief is silent on this factual issue.
157 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
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fifteen years in prison, consecutive to the sentence he was serving, with
all but five years suspended.158
The Court, in analyzing the defendant’s claim under Edwards,
emphasized that the Edwards Rule “is not a constitutional mandate, but
[a] judicially prescribed prophylaxis.”159 The court then described what
it referred to as the “paradigm Edwards case”:
That is a case in which the suspect has been arrested for a
particular crime and is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody
while that crime is being actively investigated. After the initial
interview, and up to and including the second one, he remains cut
off from his normal life and companions, “thrust into” and
isolated in an “unfamiliar,” “police dominated atmosphere,”
where his captors “appear to control [his] fate.”160

The Court then explained that, in contrast to the paradigm Edwards case,
if a suspect is “returned to his normal life,” then any “change of heart
regarding interrogation without counsel” is not likely to have been
coerced.161 For this reason, the Court rejected the idea that the Edwards
rule amounted to an “eternal” prohibition against police initiated
interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of counsel. Instead,
the Court held that the police may re-approach a suspect who had
requested counsel after the “termination” of custody and “any of its
lingering effects.”162
The Shatzer Court proceeded to determine the appropriate length of
time of the break in custody before police may re-approach a suspect
who had requested counsel. The Court set the time limit at fourteen
days.163 The Court explained that fourteen days is “plenty of time for the
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior
custody.”164 In Shatzer’s case, even though he was incarcerated, because
he was returned to his “accustomed surroundings,” and because his
detention in prison was unrelated to his willingness to cooperate in the
158 Id.; Shatzer, 954 A.2d at 1122. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and
was convicted on an agreed statement of facts consisting of a summary of the victim’s
statement and the defendant’s admissions. Id. at n.3.
159 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (citing, inter alia, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct.
2079, 2085–86 (2009)).
160 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456–57 (1966).
161 Id. at 1221. The Court was also concerned that extending Edwards would increase
the costs to society by excluding voluntary confessions from trial while minimally
deterring police misconduct. Id. at 1221–22.
162 Id. at 1222.
163 Id. at 1223.
164 Id. The Court did not provide any rationale for choosing fourteen days.
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investigation,” the two and one-half year break between interrogations
was sufficient to permit a court to conclude that his waiver of his
Miranda rights during the second interrogation was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary.165
D. Thompkins
In Berghuis v. Thompkins,166 the Court considered the manner in
which a suspect must invoke, or waive, Miranda rights. Thompkins was
a suspect in a shooting outside a mall in January 2000.167 The victims of
the shooting were involved in a dispute with the defendant and several
other men while driving through a mall parking lot in Michigan.168 The
defendant and the other men proceeded to follow the victims, with the
defendant sitting in the passenger seat of his van.169 The van pulled up
alongside the victims. Thompkins said, “What you say, Big Dog” and
then fired several shots into the victims car, killing one person and
wounding another.170
The surviving victim identified the defendant from a photograph
taken by a security camera.171 The defendant was arrested a year later in
Ohio.172 Detectives from Michigan traveled to Ohio to interview the
defendant.173 The detectives read the defendant a form advising him of
his Miranda rights.174 The defendant orally indicated that he understood
his rights, but refused to sign the form.175 The detective, at a suppression
hearing, described the interview as “very, very one-sided,” and as
“nearly a monologue.”176 Further, the defendant mostly “remained
silent,” but “shared very limited verbal responses . . .” and “talk[ed] . . .
very sporadically.”177 Mostly the defendant said, “I don’t know” or

165 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010). The Court maintained a
presumption that waivers after a suspect invokes the right to counsel are involuntary. Id.
at 1223 n.7; see also id. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
166 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). The case was brought as a habeas petition in federal
District Court in Michigan.
167 Id. at 2256.
168 See Brief for the Petitioner at 7 (available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1470_Pet
itioner.authcheckdam.pdf)
169 Id. at 7-8.
170 Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir. 2008).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 576.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Thompkins , 547 F.3d at 576.
177 Id.
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“yeah.”178 The detective said that the defendant occasionally gave nonverbal responses to questions, such as making eye contact, looking up, or
nodding his head.179
The interview lasted approximately two hours and forty-five
minutes.180 At the end, the detective asked the defendant whether he
“believed in God.”181 The detective testified that the about the
defendant’s response as follows:
I finally looked at him, and I asked him, tried to take a different
tact, what I call a spiritual tact, whether or not he believed in
God. He made eye-contact with me for one of the few times that
he did for the interview. I saw his eyes well up with tears. He
answered me orally and said, “Yes.” I asked if he had prayed to
God? And he said “Yes.” And I asked him if he had asked God to
forgive him for – I believe the words were, and I quoted them in
my report verbatim “shooting that boy down.” And he answered,
“Yes.”182

The defendant was, on the basis of this inculpatory statement and other
evidence, convicted of murder.183
The Supreme Court held that a suspect must invoke the right to
remain silent (and the right to counsel) unambiguously.184 The Court
clarified that, while a waiver of Miranda rights cannot be inferred from
silence, a waiver can be established without a “formal or express
statement.”185 Instead, an “implicit waiver” of Miranda rights can be
inferred after suspects have been informed of their rights from silence
combined with a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”186 The Court
explained:
Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given
and that it was understood by the accused, and accused’s
uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to
remain silent . . . . As a general proposition, the law can presume
that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her
rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2010).
Thompkins, 547 F.3d at 574.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
Id. at 2261.
Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979)).
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a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights
afford.187

In other words, the Court explained, “a suspect who has received and
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda
rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced
statement . . . .”188
In Thompkins, thus, the Court was able to infer a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by the defendant.
There was little dispute that the defendant received his Miranda
warnings, and there was no evidence of coercion. A waiver was inferred
from the mere act of the defendant providing a statement under these
circumstances. The Court said, “If [the defendant] wanted to remain
silent, he could have said nothing . . . or he could have unambiguously
invoked his Miranda rights and ended the interrogation.”189 In contrast,
ambiguity would harm law enforcement efforts, as “police would be
required to make difficult decisions about an accused’s unclear intent and
face the consequence of suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’”190
IV. COMMON THEMES IN RECENT SUPREME COURT MIRANDA CASES
Some commentators have suggested that the recent Miranda cases
reflect a continued effort by conservative or prosecution oriented Justices
to slowly peel back Miranda protections. In a web posting, for example,
Professor Sherrilyn Ifill of the University of Maryland suggested, after
the Thompkins decision, that the conservative majority’s approach to
Miranda is the result of a disdain for the initial decision, coupled with a
lack of real-world and defense counsel experience on the Court.191
Professor Patrick Noonan posted an article particularly responding to
Thompkins, entitled The Death of Miranda.192 In this article, Noonan
suggests that the Supreme Court’s decisions “disrupt[] the purpose and
meaning of Miranda. That is, [Thompkins] takes the power to exert
187

Id. at 2261–62.
Id. at 2264.
189 Id. at 2263. Although Miranda stated that the government has a “‘heavy burden’
to show waiver,” the Thompkins Court discounted this standard, observing that “this
‘heavy burden’ is not more than the burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 2261. The dissent argued that “inculpatory statements by themselves
are [not] sufficient” to establish a waiver. Id. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
190 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (majority opinion) (quoting Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994)).
191 Sherrilyn Ifill, Who Will Speak for the Defense on the Supreme Court?, THEROOT
(June 2, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://www.theroot.com/views/who-will-speak-defensesupreme-court.
192 Patrick J. Noonan, The Death of Miranda v. Arizona (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Seton Hall Circuit Review).
188
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control over the course of the interrogation from the defendant and
places it back into the hands of the interrogator.”193
The limiting of Miranda was also noted in the media. Time
Magazine published an article entitled, Has the Supreme Court
Decimated Miranda?194 After reviewing the Thompkins decision, the
magazine wrote:
For years, conservatives continued to attack the Miranda
decision, holding out hope that it would be reversed. In 2000, it
seemed like it might finally happen—the court had a case that
posed a direct challenge to Miranda, and it had a five-member
conservative majority. But in the end, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, leader of the conservative bloc, wrote an opinion for a
7-2 majority reaffirming Miranda. “Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice,” he wrote, “to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”
Instead of overruling Miranda, the conservative Justices have
now done something they are doing to many landmark
progressive decisions—quietly chipping away to the point that
they have little power left.195

In a similar fashion, The New York Times reported that the recent
decisions had “narrowed and clarified the scope of the Miranda
decision.”196 The Washington Post noted that “[t]he Supreme Court
[has] backed off . . . from strict enforcement of its historic Miranda
decision.”197
A. Consideration of Criminal Backgrounds in Montejo, Powell,
Shatzer, and Thompkins
A close reading of the recent opinions, however, suggests that there
may be a subtler theme running through the cases than a straightforward
attack on Miranda. In all four recent Miranda cases, the court chose to
accept cases with defendants who had significant experience with the
criminal justice system. The defendants in these cases, it can be inferred,
were familiar with the Miranda warnings from having received them in
prior contact with law enforcement. In addition, it can be inferred that
193

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Adam Cohen, Has the Supreme Court Decimated Miranda?, TIME (June 3, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1993580,00.html.
195 Id.
196 Adam Liptak, Mere Silence Doesn’t Invoke Miranda, Justices Say, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2010, at A15.
197 David G. Savage, Supreme Court Backs Off Strict Enforcement of Miranda Rights,
L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2010.
194
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the defendants were aware that the police would honor the Miranda
warnings. Finally, it could be inferred that the defendants were familiar
with police tactics and were less likely to be intimidated by the isolation
of custodial interrogation. This was raised, sometimes implicitly in the
four cases:
1. Montejo
The Court’s decision in Montejo does not explicitly mention the
defendant’s background and experience with the criminal justice system.
However, this appears to be an unstated factor in the decision. At oral
argument, counsel for the State of Louisiana noted that the defendant had
waived his Miranda rights on seven prior occasions.198 The Court’s
decision extensively discusses the potential badgering by the police
during custodial interrogations that Jackson was designed to prevent.199
However, this type of badgering is likely to have a greater effect on a
criminal defendant who is inexperienced with police tactics. Some
observers have noted that by describing the purpose of Jackson as
proscribing police badgering of suspects, the court gave less weight to
the interest of protecting the relationship “between the uninformed
suspect and his hopefully knowledgeable counsel.”200 This contrasts
defendants with experience and knowledge about the criminal justice
system who are less likely to be impacted. A defendant with multiple
prior arrests is more likely to see badgering as a tactic.
In the Montejo decision this contrast is especially clear. In deciding
to permit officers to approach represented defendants, the Montejo Court
implicitly took into account the background and experience of the
defendant. The result of the Montejo decision is most likely to be felt by
defendants who, some have noted, are “mentally retarded, mentally ill,
and juveniles.”201
For example, Geoffrey Sweeney notes that the
“procedural consequences of the Montejo decision place vulnerable
defendants at peril.”202 Yet the Court seems to be making law based on
the assumption that most defendants are like the defendant in Montejo.
The Court said, “No reason exists to assume that a defendant like
Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his intentions with
198 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)
(No. 07-1529), 2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 5, at *26. But see Transcript of Oral Argument
at 36, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 5, at *36
(Justice Kennedy: “He’s not versed in the law, he’s in this stressful situation.”).
199 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2080, 2085, 2086–87, 2089–91.
200 Adam J. Hegler, Is the Temple Collapsing?: Montejo v. Louisiana and the Extent
of the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings, 66 S.C. L. REV. 867, 883 (2010).
201 Sweeney, supra note 78, at 646.
202 Id.
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respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable
to speaking with the police without having counsel present. And no
reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.”203
2. Powell
In Powell, the Court was presented with a suspect who had ten prior
felony convictions.204 The subjective knowledge of a defendant seems to
also be behind this decision, even if not stated explicitly. During oral
argument, Justice Scalia pointedly questioned the defendant’s attorney
about whether his client actually was confused by the warning
provided.205 He asked:
This is angels dancing on the head of a pin. You want us to
believe that your client, who decided to talk, even though he was
told he could consult an attorney before any question was asked,
and he could consult an attorney at any time during the interview,
and he went ahead and—and confessed—you are saying, oh, if
he had only known. Oh, if I knew that I could have an attorney
present during the interview, well, that would have been a
different kettle of fish and I would never have confessed. I mean,
doesn’t that seem to you quite fantastic?206

The record before the Court, in fact, suggested that the defendant was
well aware of his rights when he executed the improper waiver.
In a footnote, the Court indicated that the defendant had actual
knowledge that he could have an attorney present during questioning.207
However, the Court said that this fact “does not bear on our
conclusion.”208 Thus, while the Court was not backing away from the
need for adequate warnings, the Court refused to allow possible
ambiguity to trump actual knowledge.
3. Shatzer
In Shatzer, the prior experience of the defendant with interrogations
was a significant factor in finding that the Edwards prohibition on
police-initiated interrogations after a suspect requested the presence of
203

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086–87 (emphasis added and omitted).
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175),
2008 U.S. Briefs 1175, at *4.
205 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175),
2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 72, at *34.
206 Id.
207 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205 n.7.
208 Id. See also id. at 1212 n.10 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting that “the testimony is
irrelevant” because “circumstantial evidence” of knowledge cannot replace the need to
adequate warnings).
204
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counsel could be limited to fourteen days.209 Justice Ginsburg, during
oral arguments, noted that this past experience was relevant to whether a
suspect would understand that he could exercise his right to counsel.210
She asked counsel for the defendant:
Why wouldn’t he think, I invoked my right to remain silent
without a lawyer two years and seven months ago, I will do it
again; they will have to stop questioning? Why wouldn’t that be
the most likely mindset of the defendant? He knew that it
worked the first time.211

The Shatzer Court noted that a defendant “knows from his prior
experience that he need only demand counsel to bring the interrogation
to a halt, and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely.”212 The
Court suggested that it is possible a suspect could determine, based on
his experiences “and further deliberation in a familiar setting . . . that
cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.”213 Moreover, in
weighing the costs and benefits of extending the Edwards rule, the court
considered the effects of this extension “[i]n a country that harbors a
large number of repeat offenders.”214 To support this observation, the
Court noted that, in a recent Department of Justice study, 67.5% of
released prisoners were re-arrested within three years.215
4. Thompkins
In Thompkins, the precise criminal record of the defendant was not
specified in either the Supreme Court or the state court decisions.
However, the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction, as
evidenced by his conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun, in
addition to the murder conviction.216 He also appeared to be experienced
with and unintimidated by the legal system; when he was arrested, he
initially fled from the police, then provided a false name and false
identification.217

209

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1216 (2010).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010), (No. 08-680),
2009 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 42, at *49.
211 Id.
212 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1222.
215 Id. at 1222 n.6.
216 People v. Thompkins, No. 242478, 2004 WL 202898 at *1, *4 (Mich. App. Feb. 3,
2004).
217 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 081470).
210
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The unambiguous statement requirement in Thompkins is a shift of
responsibility from law enforcement to the suspect. The Court
concluded that the statement given by the defendant was the result of a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver based on a lack of evidence of
failure of the police to provide a Miranda warning, explicit invocation of
Miranda rights, or coercion.218 The Court states its conclusion in the
negative:
The record in this case shows that [the defendant] waived his
right to remain silent. There is no basis to conclude that he did
not understand his rights, and on these facts it follows that he
chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he did speak.219

Later in the opinion, the Court provided a list of reasons why a suspect
might rationally decide to waive their Miranda rights and speak to the
police.220 The Court suggested that a suspect may gain “additional
information” to aid in the decision.221 The Court continued:
When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked at
any time, he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her
immediate and long-term interests. Cooperation with the police
may result in more favorable treatment for the suspect, the
apprehension of accomplices, the prevention of continuing injury
and fear, beginning steps towards relief or solace for the victims;
and the beginning of the suspect’s own return to the law and
social order it seeks to protect.222

The Thompkins Court thus signaled that an implied waiver of Miranda
rights is sufficient. In other words, the law does not require an express
waiver of Miranda rights. The result is that criminal defendants are
required to take the initiative to invoke, expressly and unambiguously,
their Miranda rights following their advisement of those rights.

218

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
Id. at 2262. Justice Scalia, during oral argument, put it more plainly:
I don’t understand how this person could just sit there for 2 hours and didn’t want to be
interrogated and doesn’t say: You know, I don’t want to answer your questions. He just
sits there and some questions he doesn’t answer. And he does make a few comments,
anyway. . . . Why shouldn’t we have a rule which simply says if you don’t want to be
interrogated, all you have to say is “I don’t want to answer your questions?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-1470),
2010 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 18, at *15.
220 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct at 2264.
221 Id.
222 Id.
219
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B. Consideration of Criminal Background by State and Lower Federal
Courts
The consideration of the criminal history and background of
defendants in Miranda cases is not new or unique. The United States
Supreme Court has not explicitly considered this factor in determining
whether a waiver was voluntary, however, it is implicit in another
decision. In Fare v. Michael C., the Supreme Court considered an
argument by a juvenile that he had been unable to understand his
rights.223 The Court, in rejecting this argument, noted that the juvenile
had “considerable experience with the police” and that he had “a record
of several arrests,” had served time in a “youth camp,” and was on
probation.224
More explicit examples are found in the lower courts. One example
is the recent Sixth Circuit decision in Simpson v. Jackson.225 In Simpson,
the defendant was under investigation for aiding and abetting an arson—
through the use of a Molotov cocktail—which led to the death of a child
and injuries to numerous other persons.226 The defendant challenged the
use of four statements he gave to the police.227 One of the statements
was made to a Columbus Police Department homicide detective and a
federal special agent while the defendant was in prison on an unrelated
charge.228 The interview was held in a conference room in the warden’s
office after the defendant was pulled from general population.229
After a second statement at the prison (this time, in the infirmary),
the law enforcement officers arranged the release of the defendant on
probation so that he would cooperate with the investigation.230 However,
the defendant failed to cooperate and to abide by the terms of his
probation.231 He was arrested and interrogated at police headquarters.232
Prior to the interview, the defendant was given his Miranda rights.233 He
subsequently admitted his involvement in starting the fire.234

223 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
See also supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text
(discussing Fare).
224 Fare, 442 U.S. at 726.
225 Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2010). The case came before the
federal court on a habeas review of a state court conviction.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 425.
229 Id. at 426.
230 Id. at 427.
231 Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2010).
232 Id. at 426
233 Id.
234 Id. at 425.
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When the defendant was asked whether he was willing to speak
with the officers after receiving his Miranda rights, he responded:
(1) “mmm-mmmm,” clearly in a negative way; (2) a sideways
shake of his hand and a slight shake of his head; (3) mumbling
something and then saying “nah” or “naw”; and (4) then saying
“I messed up last time I did that.” The officer then replied, “So
you don’t want to talk to us? You do or you don’t want to talk to
us?” [the defendant] responded with more negative body
language and said, “I mean, it can’t help.” Following four to five
seconds of silence, the officer said, “Well that’s up to you,
whether you want to talk to us or not, we’re not going to twist
your arm or anything like that.” [the defendant] immediately
responded, “what y’all wanna talk about?” and the officer stated,
“just basically what we’re talking about now.”235

The defendant then started to question the officer about the details of his
current arrest; the officer did not ask any questions.236 Another officer
then asked the defendant, “so do you want to talk to us about any of this
or not?”237 The defendant mumbled an intelligible response and was
handed a written Miranda waiver form.238 The defendant said, “I mean,
this right here, it really don’t make no difference, you know what I’m
saying, sign it or not.”239
The defendant in Simpson challenged the voluntariness of his
waiver, arguing that the officers “used a combination of threats and
promises, which had the cumulative effect of overbearing his will.”240
The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument.241 The court considered the fact
that the defendant was “familiar with the officers.”242 The court noted
that “it is clear that [the defendant] had extensive experience with the
criminal justice system.”243 Accordingly, “the experience of being
questioned by the police was neither new nor novel to him.”244

235

Id. at 429.
Id.
237 Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2010).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 431.
241 Id. at 433–34.
242 Id. at 432.
243 Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2010).
244 Id.; See also United States v. Marda, No. 04-10278-RGS, 2008 WL 2856783, at *1
n.5 (D. Mass. July 21, 2008) (noting that defendant “is an experienced defendant who
had been previously arrested on at least two occasions for possession of weapons and
drugs. On cross-examination, [the defendant] acknowledged his prior familiarity with the
Miranda warnings”).
236
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In another case, the Eighth Circuit considered the defendant’s
criminal history as a factor in determining whether a lengthy
interrogation rendered a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary. In
Williams v. Norris,245 the defendant was a suspect in the disappearance of
a woman in Little Rock. He was arrested on an outstanding warrant,
waived his Miranda rights, and during a thirteen-hour interview
confessed to kidnapping the woman.246 The defendant argued that his
waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary because, during the
“marathon interrogation” in a “cramped room” he was subjected to
coercive tactics, including appeals to God and sympathy for the victim’s
family.247 In rejecting this argument, the Eighth Circuit noted that the
defendant was “relatively well educated and experienced with the
criminal justice system.”248
State courts interpreting the voluntariness of a confession have been
more explicit than the federal courts in including criminal background
among the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has explicitly considered the importance of a
suspect’s familiarity with the criminal justice system.249 The court
stated, “[i]n assessing voluntariness, this court has focused heavily on
both a defendant’s education and his familiarity with the criminal justice
system. We have found significant in previous cases that the defendant
had been read his Miranda rights before the investigation at issue.”250
245

Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 854. The victim’s body was found later. Id. Based on forensic evidence, the
defendant was convicted of her rape and murder. Id.
247 Id. at 868. The Williams court suggests, without citation, that appeals to God may
be coercive. The author has not found an example in federal courts where a confession
has been suppressed as coercive for this reason. Cf. Davis v. State of North Carolina, 339
F.2d 770, 776 (4th Cir. 1964) (prayer by officer seeking God’s blessing not coercive);
Skaggs v. Parker, 27 F.Supp.2d 952, 974 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding “insufficient
evidence” that religious discussion was coercive). Supreme Court precedents are not to
the contrary. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) (Miranda waiver not
involuntary where psychiatrist testified that defendant believed God had told him to
confess); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 (1977) (“Christian burial” speech
violated right to counsel, not voluntary nature of confession). See also supra note 181–
82 and accompanying text (discussing interview with suspect in Berghuis v. Thompkins,
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), wherein detectives asked the suspect whether he “believed in
God”).
248 Williams, 576 F.3d at 869. See also Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 434 (6th Cir.
2010) (“In further support of the conclusion that [the defendant] made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his rights . . . . [He] testified that he was familiar with the criminal
justice system.”); United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a
waiver was valid in part because of the defendant’s substantial history with the justice
system).
249 State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 672 (Minn. 1998).
250 Id. (citations omitted).
246
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The Colorado Supreme Court has also explicitly provided that “the
background and experience of the defendant in connection with the
criminal justice system” is a factor to be considered in determining
whether a waiver is voluntary.251 And the Iowa Supreme Court has held
that a court should rely upon a wide range of factors in determining
whether a defendant’s waiver of rights was voluntary, including “a
defendant’s prior experience in the criminal justice system.”252
Even in situations where defendants have more limited mental
capabilities, some courts have held that prior experience with the
criminal justice system can be a significant factor in finding that
defendants voluntarily waived their Miranda rights. For example, in
United States v. Rojas-Tapia,253 the defendant was arrested on suspicion
of being involved in a plan to hijack a helicopter, and then use the
helicopter to stage a prison escape in Puerto Rico.254
During the
booking process, and after receiving his Miranda warnings, the
defendant stated that he wanted to tell the law enforcement officers about
his participation in the hijacking.255 The officers repeated the Miranda
warning, and the defendant proceeded to make a detailed confession.256
The defendant later sought to suppress the statements on the grounds that
a report indicated he had a significantly below average IQ.257 The First
Circuit rejected this argument, in part because of the defendant’s
extensive criminal history.258 The court described that defendant as
“hardly a neophyte in the criminal justice system,” noting his “extensive
prior record.”259 The court, thus, concluded that “whatever the
deficiencies in his intellectual functioning, [the defendant’s] repeated
earlier exposure to Miranda warnings made it extremely unlikely that he
failed to understand his rights at the time he made these incriminating
statements.”260
251

People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo. 1989).
State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Iowa 1992).
253 446 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
254 Id. at 2.
255 Id. at 2–3.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 7.
258 Id. at 8.
259 Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d at 8.
260 Id. (citing United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992,
1015 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1090 (10th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2000); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d
1279, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995)). A similar standard has been applied to juvenile suspects.
See United States v. Kerr, 120 F.3d 239, 241 (11th Cir. 1997) (in evaluating voluntary
nature of statement by juvenile, noting that juvenile “had a substantial history of
involvement in the Juvenile Justice System and, in fact, was a runaway from a state
252
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Other courts have relied upon the prior criminal justice system
experience of defendants to overcome concerns stemming from below
average intelligence. In United States v. Jones,261 the court found that a
defendant with only an eighth grade education and “below average
intelligence” could voluntarily waive his Miranda rights based, in part on
his “considerable previous experience with the criminal justice
system.”262 Similarly, in United States v. Conner,263 the court rejected an
effort by a defendant with a 71 IQ to have his post-Miranda confession
found to be involuntary.264 The court said,
It should be noted that this particular Defendant has been arrested
on a number of occasions. Therefore, the 37-year old Defendant
is experienced and familiar with routine police policy such as
being read his Miranda rights, being hand-cuffed, and being
transported to jail, perhaps for additional questioning.265

Finally, in Poyner v. Murray,266 the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that a
waiver by a suspect with an IQ between 79 and 85 was involuntary
where the suspect with twelve prior convictions “was no stranger to the
criminal justice system.”267 The Poyner court explained that the
suspect’s “background provided him with at least some familiarity with
his rights and with the process to which he would be subjected.”268
V. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED EMPHASIS ON THE CRIMINAL
RECORDS OF DEFENDANTS IN ASSESSING MIRANDA WAIVERS
Courts’ increased consideration of the criminal background of
suspects, whether implicit by the Supreme Court or explicit by state and
lower federal courts, in determining whether a Miranda waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently has several implications for the
facility.”); In re Richard UU, 870 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476–77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(voluntary confession by 14-year-old who “had prior experience with law enforcement
and was aware of the significance of his Miranda rights”).
261 No. 1:09-cr-00110, 2010 WL 1628049 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010).
262 Id., at *18.
263 No. 8:06-cr-342-T-30TGW, 2007 WL 1428923 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2007).
264 Id. at *1.
265 Id. But see Commonwealth v. Boyarsky, 897 N.E. 2d 574, 585 (Mass. 2008)
(defendant’s mental disorder and previous inexperience with justice system insufficient to
raise doubt about voluntariness of confession).
266 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992).
267 Id. at 1413–14.
268 Id. at 1414. See also United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 861 (4th Cir. 2005)
(waiver by a defendant with a below average IQ valid where the suspect had waived his
rights on two prior occasions). But see Boyarsky, 897 N.E. 2d at 585 (defendant’s mental
disorder and previous inexperience with justice system insufficient to raise doubt about
voluntariness of confession).
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future of the Miranda doctrine.269 In terms of individual cases, as the
Court begins to more explicitly take into account the criminal history of
suspects, the government will find it easier to make the necessary
showing to overcome the presumption against waiver. A suspect who is
familiar with the criminal justice system, Miranda warnings, and police
tactics is—it appears in the view of many courts—more likely to make
an uncoerced choice to waive Miranda rights because the suspect is more
likely to have the requisite level of comprehension.
In more general terms, I foresee two broader implications from the
greater consideration of the criminal background of suspects in
evaluating Miranda waivers. First, an increased focus on the subjective
knowledge of suspects signals a shift away from the Court’s traditional
Miranda focus on preventing abusive police practices. In the original
Miranda decision, the Court focused on “interrogation practices which
are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him
from making a free and rational choice.”270 Later, the Court in Dickerson
v. United States was more explicit in recognizing that “the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and
involuntary statements.”271 Recent decisions expounding on Miranda
have maintained the view that Miranda is aimed at curbing abusive
police practices. In Thompkins, for example, the Court examined
whether there was evidence that the defendant’s statement was
coerced.272 And in Montejo and Shatzer, the Court emphasized that the
Edwards rule was a judicially-created rule designed to prevent badgering
or coercion by the police.273
The focus on the criminal background of a defendant presents a
subtle shift in approach. Instead of relying on a prophylactic rule to
prevent abusive police tactics, the Court is starting to focus instead on
whether a particular defendant was coerced by the tactics used by the
police. In this manner, the Court is able to maintain that the failure to
give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before
custodial questioning requires exclusion of any statements obtained.
However, in the absence of a direct failure of the police to provide a
necessary Miranda warning, the exclusion of statements under the
Miranda doctrine rule will be required in fewer and fewer cases.
269

See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1966). See also Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(Miranda was intended to “reduce the risk of a coerced confession”).
271 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000).
272 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010).
273 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct 1213, 1230 (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.
Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009).
270
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This focus on the criminal background of defendants is significant
because a court is less likely to find that a suspect with extensive
experience with the police and Miranda warnings has made an
The practical
involuntary statement after receiving warnings.274
implications of this shift include a willingness to allow greater leeway to
police and greater use of aggressive police tactics when dealing with
suspects with criminal experience. In addition, as demonstrated by
Thompkins, the Court seems more likely to infer a waiver of Miranda
rights from the silence of suspects with criminal experience. If the rule
that a waiver cannot be inferred from silence is maintained, the police
will be required to make a lesser showing in order to prove that the
almost-silent suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Second, while it seems unlikely that Miranda will be directly
overruled, recent decisions and an increased focus on the criminal
background of suspects, suggest that the Miranda rules will be subtly
abandoned in favor of a more subjective test focusing on whether a
statement is the result of coercion. Indeed, some observers have
suggested that Miranda has already been indirectly overruled. For
example, Professor Friedman’s article suggests that Miranda has been
the subject of “stealth” over-ruling.275 Professor Friedman went further,
in an article on Slate.com, suggesting that the Court is intentionally
choosing cases with suspects possessing unsympathetic facts or histories:
Whittle and chip away at the rule any way he can, all the while
denying that the rule itself is in jeopardy. But to do their
whittling without getting caught, the Roberts Court has been
brilliant at stacking the deck—choosing to hear only Miranda
cases in which what the police did is so sympathetic, or what the
suspect did so awful, it’s impossible to side with the suspect.
Then, while you’re rooting against the suspect, they’re getting rid
of the rule that you thought you liked.276

While, of course, it is impossible to know the motives of the Justices,
Friedman may be overstating the Court’s intention. The question of
whether Miranda rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived has
274 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (noting that cases “in
which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was
‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates
of Miranda are rare”).
275 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona) (Jul. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1206&context=nyu_plltwp.
276 Barry Friedman and Dahlia Lithwick, Watch as We Make This Law Disappear.
How the Roberts Court Disguises its Conservatism, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2010, 6:41 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2269715/.
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always been determined on the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the case before the Court, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the suspect.277 This approach may be the best
reading of Montejo, Powell, Shatzer, and Thompkins. In all four cases,
suspects with experience dealing with law enforcement were voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently willing to engage in conversations with the
police.278
VI. CONCLUSION
The four Miranda cases decided by the Supreme Court between
May 2009 and the end of the October 2009 term, Montejo, Powell,
Shatzer, and Thompkins all featured suspects who could fairly be
described as frequent fliers. In these four cases, the Court has begun to
lose sight of Miranda’s original purpose—limiting the coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogations. Instead, the Court has begun a
subtle shift towards focusing more responsibility of the subjective
knowledge of suspects rather than the objective actions and tactics of the
police.
In particular, the Court has started to implicitly consider the
criminal background of suspects among the factors to be considered in
determining whether a Miranda waiver and subsequent statement is
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. By implicitly—and, someday,
probably, explicitly—taking the criminal experience of the suspect into
account along with the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, the Court may be engaging in a more realistic review into
whether a waiver and statement were uncoerced.

277 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
278 Viewed in hindsight, these may not have been the wisest decisions. Yet all four
suspects believed that they could gain some benefit from talking with the police.

